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’Large Scale Research Infrastructures’ (LSRIs), a subcategory of megaprojects which incorporate
a characteristic of a high or ‘super high’ level of technological uncertainty, are often undertaken as
cooperative projects with long lead times by one or more national governments. A lack of research
into the effect of the LSRI project’s lifecycle on the research organisation is apparent, particularly
when scientists and engineers exercise freedom to organise the project directly. Two case studies
used senior leadership selection as proxy for the LSRI project lifecycle using a contingency theory
framework. These were the Tevatron (Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, USA) and the Large
Hadron Collider at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). This LSRI lifecycle
is mapped onto lifecycles used in theory and in policy. Previous research did not detect that these
projects become institutionalised, so influencing the selection of new research organisation senior
leadership according to its needs at that stage of its lifecycle. This represents something of a
novelty as most contingency theory work is theoretical with few attempts to use it as a conceptual
framework for empirical evidence. The findings indicate a second new understanding, that while the
literature characterises a leadership style transition from democratic to authoritarian as the project
progresses, LSRIs exhibit a reverse transformation, probably as a product of the characteristically
high level of organisational technical competence. The construction of LSRIs maps better onto
the traditional project lifecycle and the National Science Foundation’s large facility lifecycle than
onto other lifecycles. There is a policy opportunity to commission a ‘generational survey’ upon the
completion of an LSRI, to understand the characteristics of the ‘next big machine’.
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1 Introduction
This article examines the tailoring of senior leadership selection of research organisations to meet the phase-specific
needs of Large Scale Research Infrastructures (LSRIs). LSRIs have been defined as “large scientific instrumentation,
facility, and equipment clusters that require large investments and complex engineering efforts” (D’Ippolito and Rüling,
2019). But there is often some debate regarding scope as some funders, such as the National Science Foundation (NSF)
in the United States, include human capital within the research infrastructure remit and other funders, such as the
European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI), do not. These LSRIs are often extremely large facilities
with construction budgets in the billion US dollar range: they are frequently organised as international collaborations
due to the necessary scale of investment being beyond the funding capacity of any single national research system
(Jacob and Hallonsten, 2012). The study of the field of LSRIs is still an emerging body of knowledge. The relative lack
of established conceptual frameworks for examining LSRIs creates certain conceptual challenges. Therefore, this paper
draws upon the relevant literature relating to megaprojects and technologically uncertain projects to locate LSRIs as a
subcategory of megaprojects that incorporate a high or ‘super high’ level of technological uncertainty (Shenhar and
Dvir, 1996; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).
Other authors have undertaken significant work to examine different facets of research infrastructures and experimental
collaborations using such facilities (D’Ippolito and Rüling, 2019); these include the wider economic impact of LSRIs
(Autio et al., 1996, 2004), historic narratives (Hermann et al., 1987a,b; Krige et al., 1997; Hallonsten, 2011; Hoddeson
et al., 2008; Heinze et al., 2015b; Riordan et al., 2015; Heinze et al., 2015a, 2017) and some evaluation exercises
(Irvine and Martin, 1984; Martin and Irvine, 1984a,b). Yet, despite the prominence of LSRIs in the public sphere,
their consumption of significant public funds, and the well-established policies for managing the construction of such
facilities in the US and Europe (ESFRI, 2018; NSF, 2019), the literature lacks a cohesive conceptual framework
concerning the management of LSRI construction projects by the host organisation and whether the project influences
the host. It is therefore apparent that there is a gap in knowledge in terms of understanding senior leadership of research
organisations that these LSRIs are based in. The first two research questions are linked to one another - “do these
LSRIs fit established lifecycle models?” and “if so, which model provides the best fit?”. The answers to these two
questions will allow identify the phases of an LSRI project and understand which of the lifecycle models offers the
most appropriate framework. It also provides the opportunity to clarify the links between theory, policy, and practice.
A third question examines how these phases influence leadership and is “how does leadership adapt as the project
moves through its lifecycle?”.
The research examined the construction of two large scale research infrastructures – the Tevatron at Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory (hereafter referred to as ‘Fermilab’) in the United States and the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)
at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) in the Franco-Swiss border region. The dataset draws on
archival and interview research with participants representing a broad cross section of the laboratory and experimental
communities for each LSRI. The results demonstrate that the LSRI project came to dominate both laboratories to such
an extent that senior leadership selection was heavily influenced by the needs of the project at that phase of its lifecycle.
This LSRI lifecycle does not necessarily map onto the lifecycles used by policymakers. As a result, this article identifies
an opportunity to improve current policy by capturing how the research community assesses its own future needs2 at the
end stage of an LSRI; current policy does not capture community practices and finds itself having a time scope that is
both too short to produce meaningful strategic change or too long to be actionable.
The remaining sections of this article are structured as follows: Section 2 examines the relevant literature for under-
standing and categorising LSRIs as a subcategory of the megaproject domain with an additional characteristic of a high
or very high level of technological uncertainty and the relevant leadership literature. Section 3 outlines the methodology
used for this research. Section 4 lays out the research findings from the two case studies individually and then as
consolidated findings. Section 5 discusses these findings in relation to the literature examined in Section 2 before the
conclusion in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
This section examines the most relevant bodies of literature related to large scale research infrastructures, project
lifecycles used in theory and in policy, and the megaproject literature.
2These have various terms including ‘community surveys’ and ‘roadmaps’.
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2.1 Large scale research infrastructures (LSRIs)
The domain of LSRIs shares some overlap with ‘Big Science’ projects. However, while Big Science has a dual meaning
in that, depending on context, it can refer to either large scale experimentation in the physical sciences or to the
industrial production of scientific knowledge in the post-war period (Weinberg, 1961; De Solla Price, 1963). LSRIs can
encompass a much broader range of facilities for the conduct of research (D’Ippolito and Rüling, 2019). These facilities
are of significant policy interest due to their use for the investment of public funds into knowledge production (Florio
et al., 2018).
The increasing prevalence of LSRIs, which often requires the application of organisation structure to research, is
somewhat at odds with the historic perception of science as the product of the toil of a single individual (Blankenship,
1974). Concerns over research productivity and relative prioritisation have been issues for many years (Weinberg, 1961,
1962). Within LSRIs, leaders, who tend to be responsible for prioritisation within LSRIs, have frequently been the focus
of research; indeed, this can be traced back to the early days of ‘big science’ (Hoddeson, 1992; Seidel, 1992; Heilbron
and Seidel, 1989). Senior leaders remain key focal points for a laboratory (Hermann et al., 1987a; Hoddeson and Kolb,
2003). However, the scale of resources required to realise appropriate experimental aims has often made it unrealistic
for a single national budget to bear, since overall construction budgets for research infrastructures now can exceed one
billion US dollars (Collins, 2003; Florio et al., 2016; Mountain and Cohen, 2018; ?). Greater internationalisation has
been one response to this issue (Peng, 2012; Shore and Zollo, 2015; Shore and Cross, 2015; Vincenzi and Shore, 2019).
Most of the literature examining LSRIs tend to examine the topic in terms of research evaluation. One stream of work
that can inform some of the issues raised by LSRIs is a series of articles from Martin and colleagues, which seek to
evaluate big science laboratories (Martin and Irvine, 1984a,b; Irvine and Martin, 1984). In addition, there are studies
which examine the social structure of such collaborations (Boisot, 2011; D’Ippolito and Rüling, 2019), and the returns
on investment to the wider economy (Autio et al., 2004; Castelnovo et al., 2018).3
One challenge for investigators of LSRIs is the criteria for inclusion – namely, the lower dividing point at which
a research infrastructure is considered to have become ‘large’? Although Qiao et al. (2016) proposed a definition
of LSRIs which D’Ippolito and Rüling (2019) utilised, the precise inclusion criteria were unclear. The individual
researcher therefore lacks external guidance in the definition of ‘large’. In this situation the megaproject domain
becomes particularly valuable, by setting the conceptual agenda and providing the necessary concrete guidance for
inclusion and exclusion.
2.2 Categorising LSRIs within the megaproject domain
This section examines the relevant literature that helps to place LSRIs in a subcategory of megaprojects, specifically
those that incorporate an additional dimension of a high or very high level of technological uncertainty, megaprojects
are a specific kind of project that have a minimum overall budget of one billion US dollars (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003;
Davies et al., 2009) . They generally conceived as infrastructure that will remove constraints to economic growth
rather than being independent drivers of revenue; therefore, their true value cannot be captured with the application
of traditional measures (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Examples of this project class include London Heathrow Airport
Terminal 5 (Davies et al., 2009), the Oresund Bridge (Dimitriou et al., 2014), and the London Elizabeth Line4 (Whyte
et al., 2016). At this scale, projects exhibit certain common characteristics. These include firstly the substantial use of
subcontracting as no single company will have the necessary capacity to supply all the required components for the
final product. Secondly there are significant systems integration challenges of coordinating component manufacture
across global supply chains and successfully integrating these components on-site at the right time. Thirdly, because of
their consumption of significant public funds and their association with national prestige, megaprojects are inherently
political (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). National and occasionally supranational authorities are therefore often stakeholders
and their management has been the topic of much work (Hughes, 1998; Floricel and Miller, 2001; Flyvbjerg et al.,
2003; Hughes, 2004).
Since its emergence as a field, the organisation of megaprojects has also evolved to meet organisational and technical
realities. The traditional model for the construction of megaprojects was for the client, usually a public body such
as a government department, to create detailed system specifications, regardless of whether or not they had access
to in-house technical skills essential to be able to comprehend the underlying principles (Davies, 2017). A frequent
consequence was poor definition of systems that later required substantial amendment, thus incurring substantial cost
increases (Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Davies, 2017).
3It is noted that Hallonsten and Heinze (2013) examined organisational processes within national laboratories using a framework
for institutional renewal in which long term changes amongst actors begin at the periphery before taking a central role whereas this
article uses the project as the unit of analysis.
4Formerly known as ‘Crossrail’
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LSRIs and megaprojects differ in the structure of their delivery. Modern megaproject construction generally uses a
client and delivery partner arrangement wherein the client broadly defines the goals and specifications of the systems
and then invites tenders for the construction contract (Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Davies, 2017; Davies et al., 2019).
Although any organisation can bid individually, it is not uncommon for several organisations to pool their resources
in a joint bidding venture (Davies, 2017; Davies et al., 2019). The client then selects the preferred delivery partner
from among the pitches (Davies, 2017; Davies et al., 2019). The selected delivery partner will be expected to have the
technical competence to define the systems and goals with much greater accuracy and detail than the client (Davies,
2017). In contrast, however, this model generally does not apply to LSRI projects. Many laboratories do have this
technical competence available internally, and this permits many systems to be developed in detail at an early stage of
the project.
Although many projects can be managed by using well-established methodologies (Pinto, 2012); when projects exhibit
significant technological uncertainty, the applicability of these standardised methodologies is questionable due to the
impact of the inherent uncertainty (Mcfarlan, 1981; Shenhar and Dvir, 1996).
2.3 Project lifecycles
As noted above, contingency theory pairs an appropriate leader to a situation (Fiedler, 1964); this offers the opportunity
of repeating this process, substituting a new leader as the situation changes. That projects might exhibit common
characteristics over their lifetime is well-embedded in both literature and practice (Thompson, 1997; Montgomery and
Largent, 2016). There are three primary lifecycle paradigms that are particularly appropriate for this paper: these are the
traditional project lifecycle (Frame, 1987), the Wheelwright and Clark (1992) model, and the Gluck and Foster (1975)
model. The traditional project lifecycle model is frequently used in the literature and practice, primarily because of its
wide applicability (Adams and Barnd, 1997; King and Cleland, 1997; Pinto and Slevin, 1988). It divides a project into
four phases, starting with a conceptual stage which moves onto planning and execution and concluding with termination
(King and Cleland, 1997). It is common practice for project managers to adapt their behaviours and attitudes to suit
these shifting needs (Frame, 1987; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).
Alternative project lifecycle models relevant to this work do exist. Within the literature, significant work can be
divided into documents looking at more traditional projects with clearly defined beginnings and ends to projects
that seek to develop new mass-produced products with production included in the lifecycle. There is also a more
normative body of project management work where the results can be very readily applied by practitioners although
there is still academic utility in these works (Gluck and Foster, 1975; APM, 2015; APM and PwC, 2019). Within the
product development literature, the work of Wheelwright and Clark (1992) although relatively mature is still frequently
utilised as a conceptual framework within the literature (Beauregard et al., 2016; Tiedemann et al., 2019; Kavadias
and Ulrich, 2020). Equally, from the more practitioner-focussed domain, the work of Gluck and Foster (1975) is also
prominent within the literature (Johnson et al., 2009; Brattstrom et al., 2018; Johnson and Filippini, 2013). Notably,
both Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and Gluck and Foster (1975) focussed on product development and classified
its lifecycle from research through to final production. However, there is some debate concerning the exact structure
of these two product development models (See Table 1 for a visual example mapping the models onto one another).
Both Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and Gluck and Foster (1975) agree with Frame (1987) that product development
resembles a traditional project in that managers must focus greater attention on the project during the final stages than
at the beginning, despite the issue that at the late stages, a project is likely to have acquired greater momentum and
inertia, thus becoming harder for a leader to affect the final state without incurring substantial costs. The shifting role of
organisational leadership in is considered below in Section 2.4.
Within the policy domain there have been acknowledgements that research infrastructures advance through common
lifecycles in a similar pattern, notably from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Energy
(DOE) in the United States and the European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) (ESFRI, 2018; NSF,
2019). Close examination reveals that, although NSF, DOE, and ESFRI use different terminologies, their lifecycles do
seem to be rather similar. One notable difference relates to the final phases, described as ‘Divestment’ and ‘Termination’
phases by NSF and ESFRI respectively. The ‘Divestment’ phase indicates that it is possible to include an older machine
in the supporting infrastructure of a new one, whereas the term ‘Termination’ does not. It is also noteworthy that ESFRI
(2018) has identified that “. . . the set of skills required by an RI [research infrastructure] may change markedly during
its lifecycle”, although the document failed to provide an elaboration as to how these skill requirements might change.
This suggest that there may be a gap in policy understanding of how leadership changes during a project lifecycle – a
gap that this article fills.
Despite these well-developed lifecycles used in industry and in policy, the role of leadership as a means of achieving
these goals is less well-understood. Section 2.4 below provides an overview of the relevant generalised leadership
4
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Table 1: A summary of the development project phases proposed by Wheelwright (1992) and Gluck and Foster (1975)
















































literature and looks and how leadership can be harnessed within project lifecycles and similar large high-technology
projects to LSRIs.
2.4 Leadership paradigms
The leadership literature describes two broad paradigms into which most theory can be organised. The first, the style
paradigm, divides leaders into two discrete categories based on the characteristics which they display (Bass, 1990).
Leaders could theoretically shift their classification by changing behaviours to fit the new needs of an evolving situation
(Bass, 1990). The second, the evolutionary paradigm, starts from the premise that leaders were born great and that
research should chart the development of these great people to replicate these conditions for future leaders. From this
evolutionary paradigm, the concept of contingency theory is more applicable to this work.
2.4.1 Style paradigm
Although very many potential leadership styles have been identified in the literature, most of it refers to five primary
styles, being transformational, transactional, authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership (Bass, 1990).
Transformational leadership is often idealised in the literature, and, in popular culture, such leaders tend to be highly
charismatic and articulate a vision in terms of basic human values such as truth and high moral standards (Bass, 1990;
Bass and Avolio, 1993; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1996; Tracey and Hinkin, 1998; Raziq et al., 2018; Zaman et al., 2019).
This vision acts as a powerful tool for gathering a group of followers, motivated by the inherent virtue of the vision
rather than by the possibility of pecuniary rewards (Bass and Avolio, 1993). The effect of transformational leadership
becomes more exaggerated as one moves up the organisational structure although its effect amongst project managers is
still uncertain (Keegan and Den Hartog, 2004; Kissi et al., 2013). This provides additional justification for examining
the effect of senior leadership on a project given its exaggerated effect on project outcomes.
Transactional leadership can be considered as a contrast to transformational leadership (Bass, 1990; Rowold, 2006;
Tyssen et al., 2013). While transformational leaders tend to gather followers with the aid of their vision, transactional
leaders are generally granted authority by their position within the organisational structure and seek to implement
tasks within resource constraints (Bass, 1990). Such transactional leaders tend to pursue a strategy of management by
exception, whereby they do not interact with subordinates unless output drops below certain minimum expectations
(Bass and Avolio, 1993; Rowold, 2006). It appears to be somewhat ineffective in knowledge-intensive industries due to
its as it negatively impacts entrepreneurial behaviour which Alsfar considered to be the ability to identify and exploit
new opportunities; this may render transactional leadership incompatible with the highly autonomous nature of research
and organisations that host LSRIs.
Laissez-faire leadership is the style in which the leader grants full autonomy to the team to determine goals and
mechanisms for task implementation (Bass, 1990). This allows the leader to focus fully on other tasks such as securing
resources for the rest of the team (Baumgartel, 1956; Andrews and Farris, 1967; Mumford et al., 2002). It is traditionally
5
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referred to rather negatively in the literature as being by far the least satisfactory leadership style for team members due
to lower output quality and greater levels of disorganisation and frustration amongst the team (?). This theory has been
somewhat demonstrated on a very short timescale by Breevaart and Zacher (2019).
While laissez-faire leadership fully delegates decision-making to the team, authoritarian leaders fully centralise decisions
with the leader, who demands unquestioning obedience to their chosen path (Bass, 1990; Cheung, 2013). This can be
a challenging style for teams to work under and it can negatively affect performance and relationships (Schaubroeck
et al., 2017), but there can be some benefit to authoritarian leadership. Authoritarian leaders have been identified in
the literature as being particularly valuable during a crisis as they can take the necessary but unpopular decisions to
re-establish control of the situation (Kidder, 1981; Taubes, 1986; De Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). There is some
further sub-structure to this category of leadership with authoritarian leadership often divided into benevolent and
punitive forms (Rachlin and Harrower, 1967). The primary distinction between these is whether the authoritarian leader
emphasises the possibility of future reward for obedience or punishments for non-compliance (Rachlin and Harrower,
1967). Current work indicates that employees are indeed more receptive to authoritarian leadership if it occurs within a
broader organisational culture of benevolence (Ahmad Bodla et al., 2019).
The final category of leadership is democratic leadership, which. can be considered as being midway between
authoritarian and laissez-faire leadership. A democratic leader seeks to set general goals and timelines for the team but
allows the team to determine how to achieve those goals (Gastil, 1994; Bass, 1990). It can be an effective leadership
style but requires buy-in from the collective to facilitate a culture of participative decision-making (López-Roca and
Traver-Martí, 2020).
2.4.2 Contingency theory
Contingency theory starts from the premise that leaders and situations can be classified, and the most appropriate leader
can be identified and selected for a situation (Fiedler, 1964; Bratton, 2020). It provides a seemingly rational process for
the selection of candidates for a research organisation, especially as the needs of the project changes during its lifecycle.
There is some research examining megaprojects using a contingency theory perspective (Shenhar and Holzmann, 2017;
Söderlund et al., 2017; Gil and Pinto, 2018);however the literature review did not identify any work examining the
specific topics of senior leadership or LSRIs using this perspective.
The method for assessing the leader is the Least Preferred Co-worker scale (LPC), where the level of task- and
relationship-motivation is assessed (Fiedler et al., 1976). Task-motivated leaders use the parameter of task completion
to evaluate performance, using incentives and punishments to drive adherence to plans individual employees not being
a typical concern (Fiedler, 1964; Bons and Fiedler, 1976; Fiedler et al., 1976). By contrast, relationship-motivated
leaders seek to facilitate team interactions, assuming that internal knowledge interchange will create more effective
solutions (Fiedler, 1964).
Three key factors are available for classifying a situation: leader-member relations, task structure, and position power
(Fiedler, 1964). Leader-member relations refers to the group dynamic and attitudes toward the leader (Mumford et al.,
2000). Leaders with good team relations will likely have have more influence on satisfied, productive followers, while
an atmosphere of mutual hostility and poor performance creates poor relations (Wheeless et al., 1984; Clampitt and
Downs, 1993; Campbell et al., 2003). Leader-member exchange (LMX) further develops this thinking by expanding the
relationship scope to include the influence of the group on the leader (Uhl-Bien, 2006; Sparrowe, 2020).
Task structure, the second tool for assessing the situation, is a measure of work standardisation (Mott, 1971; Gillen and
Carroll, 1985). A more standardised task will have set procedures and will be less likely to suffer a schedule slippage;
this will suit a task-focussed leader expecting at least certain minimum output levels (Pinto, 2012). Tasks that are less
standardised may be better suited to a relationship-motivated leader who promotes a knowledge-sharing environment
(Tosi and Tosi, 1976). Since LSRIs appear to embody the characteristics of both technically uncertain projects and
megaprojects, suggesting that there may be a low level of task structure and that leaders focus on facilitating the sharing
of knowledge rather than adherence to schedules.
Position power is the third factor determining a situation and it describes the powers that the leader has to reward or
discipline team members. A leader with a wider range of powers has a greater power in this regard than one whose
powers are less wide-ranging (Fiedler, 1964; Bratton, 2020). An individual in a senior leadership position will have
greater power to influence the direction of the organisation, but it may take some time for the effects of such decisions
to become apparent.
Contingency theory offers the possibilities for an organisation to tailor leadership selection to meet certain phase-specific
needs or a leader can adapt their own behaviours to suit a new situation. This naturally raises queries regarding the
evolution of a project over its lifetime. Given that LSRI projects may have long lead times between its technical
conception and first data acquisition (Riordan et al., 2012), host research organisations may perform a similar leadership
6
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assessment exercise when selecting a new senior leader. The lifecycles above may play an important role in determining
what characteristics are desirable for the senior leader at that time. Conceptually, both Wheelwright and Clark (1992)
and Gluck and Foster (1975) describe a change in leadership style during the project lifecycle from a more laissez-faire
or democratic style to an authoritarian one. This is despite the obvious issue that changing a project at late stages may
incur significant costs and may not be technically feasible due to cascading consequences across the entire system.
Nonetheless this provides some sort of conceptual framework for the research. There is some literature considering the
role of leadership is in large complex projects such as LSRIs. Most of this literature uses the ‘systems builder’ concept
as a conceptual framework as developed by Hughes (1979, 2004). Such systems builders, who can be either individual
persons, teams, or even entire institutions, primarily seek to manage the interfaces between different systems in an array
(Sovacool et al., 2018). It is a particularly prominent concept within traditional infrastructure literature (Davies, 1996;
Geels, 2007; Magnusson, 2012; Blomkvist and Larsson, 2013; Manders et al., 2016; Sovacool et al., 2018).
3 Method
When considering the design of this this research there were two broad scientific disciplines with LSRIs that met the
budgetary inclusion criteria of an overall spend of least $US 1 billion on the project, namely high energy physics
(often referred to as ‘particle physics’) and space science. One primary concern when considering the types of science
to investigate was the ‘dual use’ nature of space science projects, with militaries playing significant roles whether
as clients for the project or as part of the delivery partner consortium. This factor influenced the decision to select
cases from particle physics projects. A second practical consideration related to the incidence of LSRIs, because
billion-dollar projects do occur rather infrequently. Fortunately, there have been two similar particle physics projects at
laboratories that even had an intense rivalry - these are the Tevatron and the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) (Lederman,
1983; Hoddeson et al., 2008; Evans, 2014). Furthermore, these two projects happen to be broadly representative of
accelerators in particle physics. The consideration of multiple projects provides the basis for stronger conclusions as a
distinction can be made between what is unique to a single LSRI and what may be more generalisable (Yin, 1994). As
discussed above, most research investigating LSRIs and ‘big science’ projects have attempted to build theory using only
a single project Florio et al. (2016); Florio and Sirtori (2016); Schopper (2016); D’Ippolito and Rüling (2019). This
potentially introduces many of the methodological risks observed by (Yin, 1994) and
The fieldwork underpinning this article was conducted as part of a doctoral study. The cases examined were the Tevatron
at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in the United States and the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at the
European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) located on the Franco-Swiss border. The selection of case studies
was dictated by the need to obtain data in a timely fashion (Yin, 1994; Stake, 2005).
3.1 Data collection and analysis
The primary fieldwork was composed of two phases for each of the two large scale research infrastructures. The first
phase comprised archival research, examining documentation including early project proposals, design reports, and
project management meeting minutes. This research enabled an appreciation of the internal laboratory context and the
identification and triangulation of discussion prompts and claims made by interviewees respectively. The second phase
constituted interviews with individuals representing a broad swathe of the laboratory community. These two different
research methods allowed triangulating, thereby providing a stronger foundation for the findings while mitigating some
of the weaknesses associated with interviewing individuals about events that took place many years in the past. There
were sixteen interviews examining the Tevatron at Fermilab and nineteen interviews examining the LHC at CERN. A
summary of the interviews including duration, project roles, and which project phases the interviewee was present for is
given in Appendix 1.
The analysis was conducted along thematic lines using manual analysis to mitigate the concern that using a discourse or
textual analysis might lead to certain ‘off-the-cuff’ comments, resulting in inaccurate conclusions (Dexter, 2006). The
process of coding the interviews began by unifying all comments about a specific topic into a single array; this did
occasionally necessitate duplication of statements when one could be considered relevant to two arrays. At this early
stage, the Tevatron and LHC fieldwork was kept separate. Following this brief initial coding each statement within an
array was essentially distilled into the key theme described. During the analysis many similar themes emerged within a
single array and theorised how these themes might relate to LSRI leadership and lifecycles in line with (Yin, 1994);
particular consideration was given to the leadership and project activities that took place within each phase to identify
where there was overlap and where additional work was conducted that current theory and practice had not yet captured.
Where were disputes regarding when certain activities took place, greater credence was given towards primary interview
data discussing leadership activities which perhaps represented operationalisation of the project. This was a difficult
issue and perhaps represents a limitation of the research. After creating a theory explaining each array, such as the
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needs of the project at a given point in time and how the senior leader met those needs, each theory was integrated
to form a broader understanding of leadership in LSRIs. The final stage in the process was to compare the theories
that had emerged from each separate case study to determine what factors were common to both case studies and to
examine whether these theories could be explained using existing knowledge. Figure 1 below summarises the data























Figure 1: A summary of the data collection and analysis process
4 Findings
This section focusses on a particularly unexpected insight provided by interviewees that emerged during the fieldwork.
The interviews revealed a strategy that both Fermilab and CERN tailored senior leadership selection primarily to meet
the needs of their project at that specific point in its lifecycle. This trend seemed to be less apparent at Fermilab
compared to CERN owing to its different governance arrangements (Hoddeson et al., 2008). Nonetheless, it proved to
be a key factor behind the successful construction of the Tevatron.
4.1 Evidence from the Tevatron at Fermilab
The Tevatron at Fermilab was an accelerator constructed in the 1980s, although its foundations can be traced back
much further. It could operate in either a fixed target mode5 or in a collider mode6 and its opening marked the first
use of superconductivity7 in particle physics (Hoddeson, 1987), allowing the discovery of new particles including the
top quark (Collaboration et al., 1995). When operating in collider mode, it could achieve a peak energy in 1 TeV in a
centre of mass frame when colliding protons and antiprotons. Its closure in 2011 was hastened by the commissioning of
the LHC and the subsequent loss of the ‘energy frontier’ by the Tevatron (Oddone, 2011; Anon, 2011). At Fermilab,
directors are not limited to terms of office, and there is no informal convention that directors must serve for a specified
period. This has resulted in directorships ranging from as long as eleven years to as short as six years.
The Tevatron was conceived primarily in response to the new ability of scientists to use superconductivity to create high
powered magnetic fields (Hoddeson, 1987). These developments were identified by Wilson during the construction of
the original accelerator at Fermilab, the Main Ring (Hoddeson, 1987). These quotes illustrate the popular perception of
these events:
“When Bob [Wilson] arrived, very soon he wanted to build a superconducting ring accelerator.
Focussed on building it and the lab.” (Source: F6)
And:
5This is an operation mode in which the machine accelerated a particle beam before colliding these particles with a stationary
particle ‘target’.
6This is an operation mode where the machine accelerated two counter-rotating beams of particles before colliding these beams.
As the beams are orbiting in opposite directions, it is possible to achieve collisions at much higher energies than in a fixed target
mode.
7This is a physical state in which extremely cold materials achieve a resistance of zero and can therefore carry very high currents.
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“Bob [Wilson] always had a plan for a bigger machine than the Main Ring. . . when superconductivity
appeared on the horizon; Bob [Wilson] noticed its potential and started quietly moving things.”
(Source: F7)
This new machine, in which the Main Ring would be upgraded to take advantage of superconductivity, was originally
identified as the ‘Energy Doubler’ (Hoddeson et al., 2008). However, while Wilson may have moved funding to take
advantage of new developments, socio-political events soon became the more pressing issue (Hoddeson et al., 2008).
This shift in relative importance can be linked to the 1970’s Oil Crisis, which led to a major re-organisation of the US
science policy landscape where the US national laboratory system transitioned from being administered by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) to the new Department of Energy. This coincided with a change in public attitudes toward
science and now scientists felt forced to ‘compete’ with other areas of the federal budget. Wilson was more accustomed
to the old funding methods under the AEC where technological novelty was one of the primary determinants for a
successful funding bid:
“Bob [Wilson] would build with the assumption that if you build it, then the experimental ideas will
come. His [Wilson’s] main metric for measuring success was machine performance.” (Source: F4)
As discussed above, Interviewee F11 described Wilson as having an attitude in which novel technology could solely
justify investment. But his attitude was not just ill-suited to the times but according to F11, he was also ill-suited to
meeting the Tevatron’s needs at this stage:
“He [Bob Wilson] was the best project initiator but not the best listener. Despite his forceful nature,
he was very laissez-faire when it came to other things.” (Source: F11)
A copy of Wilson’s resignation letter reveals his concerns about the US funding for the Tevatron, particularly in
comparison to the significant financial resources that were available to CERN (Anon, 1978). Wilson directly linked his
decision to resign to the President Carter’s fiscal year 1979 budget proposal, which allocated only a small inflationary
increase to the budget. Wilson and the various funding agencies had a long history of difficult relations dating back at
least to the early days of Fermilab, as the quote from Interviewee F7 demonstrates:
“Bob (Wilson) had saved $20 million from building the lab which he felt was his. . . ” (Source: F7)
This attitude can be seen as contrasting with the reasonable premise that savings from a project might be reimbursed to
the funding agency. This is particularly applicable to an era of restraint in science budgets. However, Wilson’s ability to
convince people to come together to help him achieve his goals for the laboratory made him ideal to be the leader during
the initial construction of the laboratory, where there would have been many new employees with the potential for
unification under the umbrella of his vision. Likewise, his charisma allowed him to persuade others to push themselves
to achieve the seemingly impossible. In the words of Interviewee F5:
“Bob [Wilson] was a leader and a father figure. As his leaving gift he built a sculpture and had
welders teach him how to weld, even though he wasn’t in the union; he was just so nice people wanted
to help him. You even needed his approval to cut down trees on-site as he wanted to re-create the
frontier.” (Source: F5)
Following Wilson’s departure, a new Fermilab director, Leon Lederman - originally from Columbia University - was
selected. This provides an opportunity to examine whether this new director might have been more suited to meet
the changed needs of the Tevatron than Wilson. Lederman took very different approaches to DOE and running the
laboratory, as observed by the interviewees. He was observed to be delegating far more than Wilson. Interviewee F5
best described the change from Wilson to Lederman:
“It was a change in leader from a builder to an experimenter. He . . . was a good delegator but also
knew how to set guidelines and parameters.” (Source: F5)
This represented a shift in leadership style from the somewhat authoritarian Wilson to a democratic Lederman,
Interviewee F4, who had also described Wilson as a builder, also categorised Lederman:
“Leon [Lederman] had ideas about how to experiment on it [the machine] while building.” (Source:
F4)
Interviewees F10 and F4 also described how Lederman, although not the builder of an institution, understood how to
run an existing research institution and optimise it for conducting research:
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“Leon [Lederman] wasn’t a manager but he really knew how to pump out physics, even then he’d
rather talk physics than policy.” (Source: F10)
And:
“He [Lederman] took the Fermilab that Bob [Wilson] built and put it on a course with more focus.”
(Source: F4)
As a result of these new governance arrangements Lederman did not transfer the directorship to meet the changed
needs for the next phase, that of construction. But Lederman did account for this change in phase by transitioning to an
oversight role and delegating most of the authority to three project managers. This clearly visible in the minutes of
the project management meetings from that time. There, while Lederman did delegate substantially, he did retain the
right to make key technical decisions. In the early meetings for one of the Tevatron projects there were four potential
technologies that were available for the generation of antiprotons:
“(1) A precooler cooler design with all the antiprotons you could ask for,
(2) An all-stochastic antiproton cooling scheme,
(3) A boxcar stacking of antiprotons in a smaller precooler ring,
(4) Antiproton deceleration and cooling in a set of four rings.
When asked what happens at the end of the day, Leon [Lederman] said ‘I make a decision’.” (Source:
Project Management Group Meeting Minutes from November 21, 1980)
This is also supported by statements from F2:
“Democratic leaders may give the impression of democracy, but this may not be a reality. But it’s
useful to appear to be one, but steer when necessary. He (Lederman) would listen but take his own
counsel and decide for himself.” (Source: F2)
These observations suggest that directors play vital roles in discrete phases in the life of an LSRI project. Wilson
helped in the conception of the Tevatron, guiding it through early life and making important technical decisions,
thereby showing authoritarian tendencies. However, Wilson was not particularly well-suited to securing funding in
the new environment of the 1970’s because of his attitude that novel technology by itself justified funding. Lederman
could better engage with stakeholders to secure funding and command the confidence of these now budget-conscious
government agencies before delegating most of the authority for construction to project managers while reserving some
key decisions.
4.2 Evidence from the Large Hadron Collider at CERN
The LHC at CERN, which commenced operation in 2008 is currently the highest energy particle collider in the world
(CERN, 2016). At the time of writing (2020), it is currently in a prolonged shutdown for upgrades to the magnet
and cryogenics systems but during its two previous operating ‘runs’ sufficient data were created to allow scientists to
confirm the existence of the Higgs boson, one of the fundamental constituents of matter (Aad et al., 2012; Riordan et al.,
2012). The construction of the LHC was a major shift in CERN’s culture; Martin and Irvine (1984a) had previously
queried choice to build technologically conservative and expensive machines that could not be used to make new
particle discoveries. The LHC marked a shift in CERN towards constructing much more innovative designs that could
be used to discover new particles. During its early stages, one of the key champions for the LHC was Carlo Rubbia,
who has been extensively examined for his distinctively authoritarian leadership style (Krige, 2001b,a; Taubes, 2003).
Due to its status as an intergovernmental organisation, one of CERN’s more unusual institutional policies is that the
Director-General as the senior leader of the organisation serves a single five-year term8 (Hermann et al., 1987b,a; Krige
et al., 1997). This provided the possibility of tailoring Director-General selection according to the medium-term needs
of the construction project.
The observation that Directors-General had differing goals to fulfil during their tenures first emerged during the
fieldwork at Fermilab, with Interviewee F7 :
“At CERN the LHC effectively ran the lab. Each DG was selected to suit the needs of the project,
building then upgrading; [I] bet that there’ll be a data miner next.” (Source: F7)
About half of the interviewees said that the tradition that a CERN Director-General served a single five-year term
provided this opportunity as seen below:
8It is noted that Fabiola Gianotti has recently been appointed to a second five-year term as CERN Director-General. But this is an
exception to the historic norm.
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“There were four DGs [Directors General] over the life of LHC, all very suited to the period [of time]
and part of the project” (Source: C1)
And:
“You need transformational leadership at some point in the project lifecycle, a [Robert] Wilson-esque
person [the first director of Fermilab]. The vision to do something great. At other times, it’s useless.
The R&D phase requires a different leader and you become more transactional or democratic toward
the end stages.” (Source: C15)
And:
“The definition of success varies between leaders.” (Source: C16)
It is noteworthy that Interviewee C15 described the need for a ‘Wilson-esque’ leader at the early stage to craft the vision
for the project. This also highlights a leadership trajectory that conflicts with the literature as the literature indicates that
leadership becomes less democratic, not more, towards project end stages.
4.2.1 Carlo Rubbia
Carlo Rubbia served as Director-General in the early years of the LHC; during this period, he became personally
involved in many of the discussions concerning the LHC. These included defending the LHC from attacks regarding its
value compared to alternative options (Fraser, 1997; Smith, 2007).
Approximately three quarters of the interviewees described instances of personal contact with Rubbia, while the
remaining quarter knew him by reputation. All comments featured two obvious themes about Rubbia relating to his
strongly authoritarian leadership style coupled with his technical competence. Two interviewees even suggested that
because of his ability to marshal resources to ensure success as described by Krige (2001b), he dominated CERN to
such the extent that the entire organisation became dependent on him:
“I knew his reputation, but the meeting of the directorate was incredible as they were like mice around
him.” (Source: C4)
And:
“You could never grow a leader like him using a textbook [but] I could see the culture of fear he left"
(Source: C2)
These quotes demonstrate the ability of Rubbia to propose new experiments and shepherd the LHC concept through
the early stages thanks to what interviewees described as his genius and his authoritarian character. This is clear from
Taubes (1986, 2003) as well as from the quotes below:
“Carlo Rubbia was ingenious, had many ideas, and knew how to structure his thinking.” (Source:
C12)
And:
“As far from real management as you could get, everyone loved him, but he was hell to work with.
Charismatic, unpredictable. Carlo Rubbia could destroy you if you weren’t of strong character.
Almost alienated people but still putting out whacky ideas even now!” (Source: C1)
And:
“I’ve been personally squeezed by Carlo, he’s brilliant. On Christmas Eve one year I was about to
leave CERN at 7pm when he sends over a four-page proposal to push for a muon collider. Brilliant
mind.” (Source: C5)
However, Interviewee C6’s quote shows that Rubbia tended to lose interest in any single proposed experiment or project.
This indicates an essential similarity between the styles of Rubbia and Wilson. In both cases, the interviewees at their
respective laboratories considered them excellent project initiators but less adept at closing projects.
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4.2.2 Christopher Llewellyn-Smith
Christopher Llewellyn-Smith was the second Director-General over the LHC construction period. During his term,
the CERN Council formally approved the LHC as a two-stage project and, as a result of creative funding mechanisms
devised by CERN management, converted this approval to a single-stage project. When asked about Llewellyn-Smith’s
purpose in relation to the LHC, almost all interviewees stated that his success was in taking Rubbia’s vision and turning
it into something that was realistically workable, as described by Interviewee C6:
“. . . a great DG for getting LHC approved. Required a lot of deal making, he was definitely the right
person at the right time.” (Source: C6)
Effectively the change was from what machine to how to build a specific one. Interviewee C1 described how the change
in style Rubbia and Llewellyn-Smith unlocked new ways to secure support for the LHC:
“Carlo Rubbia was more confrontational but when Christopher Llewellyn-Smith came in, the doors
just opened for this polite English gentleman. . . . His management style is to like structure.” (Source:
C1)
The statement from Interviewee C1 that Llewellyn-Smith “liked structure” illustrates that during this time, CERN
transitioned from being heavily dependent on a single charismatic leader back to a more traditional structure with
clearly defined roles and operating procedures. Llewellyn-Smith delegated to others and provided oversight over
these various activities. This contrasts with Rubbia’s more direct role and represents both Llewellyn-Smith’s more
transactional leadership style and the breadth of work required. The interviewees expressed no agreed view regarding
Llewellyn-Smith’s leadership style. There was a wide range of categorisations, with most of them describing Llewellyn-
Smith as primarily a mix of transformational and democratic leadership, although two interviewees also categorised
Llewellyn-Smith to a lesser extent as transactional. The introduction of more transactional leadership is in line with
the literature that leaders tend to become more transactional as the project progresses (Frame, 1987; Turner, 1999).
However, rather than the leader changing behaviour, as the literature suggests (Tracey and Hinkin, 1998), the findings
indicate that it is better for the project to select a new senior leader who embodies the desired attitudes to manage this
new situation.
4.2.3 Luciano Maiani
Luciano Maiani was the third Director-General of the LHC during its construction and, during his term, much of the
construction was completed. Roughly three quarters of the interviewees described the laboratory atmosphere during
this time as solely focussed on constructing the LHC. This can be evidenced by the decision of CERN management to
shut down the CERN accelerator complex in order to free up resources for the LHC (Abbott, 2002a). The LHC project
leader, Lyndon Evans, was allowed enough autonomy to run the project as necessary. The organisational structure
of CERN was even temporarily changed to a matrix style with the project cutting across the traditional departments,
sections, and groups (Lebrun and Taylor, 2017). The role of CERN management was to track the project and maintain
the confidence of the Council in the project. Only a single interviewee described Maiani specifically:
“We had Christopher Llewellyn-Smith and Carlo Rubbia in the late 80s and 90s, what about after
that? Luciano Maiani was less organised, less democratic, more authoritarian. He didn’t discuss so
much.” (Source: C6)
This may not be such a surprising assessment, considering that the laboratory was then focussed on building the LHC,
with most of the technological problems solved. Then the project could be managed in a more traditional manner,
focussing on cost-control and remaining on schedule. Unfortunately, during 2001, a re-calibration of the budget to
account for changes in the wider economic environment revealed that the 1990s projected costings had been extremely
optimistic and a budget gap of around 700 MCHF had developed (Adam, 2001). Widespread changes were introduced
to the accounting and operating procedures at CERN in exchange for the additional 400MCHF from Member States to
reassure the CERN Council that LHC spending was under control. These included the introduction of a new accounting
method, Earned Value Management and even the temporary shutdown of the CERN accelerator complex to free up
resources (Abbott, 2002b).
Maiani’s characteristics as a leader resembled those of Llewellyn-Smith considered above. Both were more transactional
than Rubbia, but while Llewellyn-Smith was democratic, Maiani’s tenure marked a return to a somewhat authoritarian
style of leadership at CERN. However, none of the interviewees described Maiani as being as authoritarian as Rubbia,
contrasting the benevolent Maiani with that of the punitive Rubbia. When there were issues, such as the 2001 budget
crisis, Maiani intervened to maintain the trust of the Council and demonstrate that the project was under control. He
exhibited similar diplomatic abilities to Llewellyn-Smith but aimed at different goals.
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4.2.4 Robert Aymar
Robert Aymar was the fourth and final Director-General during the phase of LHC construction, moving from his
previous role as President of the CERN Council. During his time as Director-General the LHC was completed,
although there was a magnet quench incident soon after the LHC achieved first beam circulation which damaged
equipment and delayed full operation of the LHC (CERN, 2008). Aymar was categorised by every interviewee as being
more authoritarian than the other Directors-General by the five interviewees who were willing to discuss him. Three
interviewees even suggested that he was not a true member of the CERN community, as exemplified by Interviewee
C6’s quote:
“Aymar was definitely authoritarian, like a General as he was one . It doesn’t work in high energy
physics so there was a cultural conflict.” (Source: C6)
He was also rather dismissively referred to C16 as:
“. . . essentially a manager. He pushed for collisions without tests.” (Source: C16)
The quote from Interviewee C6 may not be surprising given that the literature tends to view authoritarians positively
at the end stages of a project when the main technologies should be well-understood. Aymar exhibited similar
characteristics to Maiani, being both transactional and authoritarian. However, seemed to grate with the CERN
community, as illustrated by the comments above, indicating that a different approach might have been more successful.
4.3 LSRI phases
This section firstly examines the LSRI phases that emerged from the fieldwork. As Fermilab and CERN had relatively
more leeway to organise the construction of their respective machines as they saw expedient compared to other
megaprojects, their respective lifecycles were slightly different to those identified in Section 2.3. The second part of this
section draws upon the evidence and relevant theory to answer the first and second research questions which are “do
these LSRIs fit established the lifecycle models?” and “if so, which model provides the best fit?”. The third part of
this section addresses the third research question, “how does senior leadership adapt as the project moves through
its lifecycle?”. The finding that the selection of different leaders is partly linked to a particular project phase suggests
that selection panels have effectively adopted a contingency theory framework for senior leadership selection; whether
this has been as a result of deliberate decisions cannot be determined due to the ‘black box’ nature of recruitment and
selection. There appear to be common phases within the lifetimes of the two LSRIs investigated.
4.3.1 Initiation
This is the first phase of the project, where many technical options are explored and eventually narrowed down to a
single LSRI technical design which forms the basis for the LSRI project. Even during this early stage, senior leaders
are involved in making decisions, particularly when changes in one sub-system of the project may have cascading
consequences across the entire array of systems. A senior leader will need the conceptual and political skills to
understand issues relating to different systems and manage these risks appropriately. Once the LSRI has a fixed design,
the senior leader seeks to secure the LSRIs place within future strategy. Research institutions tend to recruit charismatic
authoritarian senior leaders during this time to take these decisions and unite the workforce.
4.3.2 Approval
The second phase of the project builds on the previous phase to develop the project beyond a concept into a feasible
reality. A senior leader must further engage with stakeholders to secure funding for the project as well as to develop
mechanisms that will allow progress and quality to be measured. In some cases, the negotiation of novel funding or
diplomatic agreements to render the project feasible. During this time, there is a transition in leadership to a more
democratic style.
4.3.3 Construction
This is the third phase of the construction project where a senior leader generally does not directly manage the project.
Instead, the project leader or manager will provide day-to-day management of the project, and senior involvement only
occurs if stakeholder trust is at risk. In these situations, the senior leader must intervene but the scientific community
perceives this as someone reluctantly stepping in to avert a greater crisis.
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4.3.4 Exploitation
This fourth and final phase begins as the LSRI starts operation. During this time, the focus shifts to supporting
experimental collaborations during first data acquisitions and system optimisation and upgrades. The second, horizon
scanning, involves looking towards the future and the next big machine. Although senior leaders generally do not lead
these efforts, they support it by allocating resources from within the normal laboratory operating budget. Eventually a
new leader emerges and crafts a new vision for this new LSRI, and the cycle will begin again.
4.4 Research Question 3: how does leadership adapt as the project moves through its lifecycle?
A summary of each project’s phases and the characteristics of the phase-specific senior leader can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: A summary of the characteristics of each phase during the Tevatron and LHC construction and the respective
















Superconductivity identified as promising technology.
Laboratory budget funds R&D
Previous accelerator completed.
Possibility of augmenting it with a Large Hadron Collider.






Wilson resigns after failure to secure funding.
Leon Lederman becomes new director.
Uses new strategy to secure Tevatron funding
Rubbia’s term as DG ends.
Llewellyn-Smith builds agreements
amongst international community
Initially transformational and authoritarian.
Later more democratic
More democratic and consensus driven
Construction
Lederman remains director.
Most project responsibility handed
to three project leaders.
Lederman provides oversight
Llewellyn-Smith’s DG term ends.
Maiani and later Aymar provide oversight
over the project leader (Lyndon Evans)
No director change, heavily delegation
represents a more laissez-faire style
Relatively laissez-faire but
reserving right to intervene
Exploitation
Laboratory community uses new machine.
Community begins designs for next big machine.
’First physics’ during Aymar term.
Upgrades during subsequent Director-Generalships.





Continuing to be laissez-faire.
Supporting future community needs
A consolidated summary of the characteristics of the phases and how senior leadership shifts can be found in Table 3.
This answers Research Question 3 how does leadership adapt as the project moves through its lifecycle?:
5 Discussion
This section draws upon the evidence and relevant theory to answer and discuss the first and second research questions
which are “do these LSRIs fit established the lifecycle models?” and “if so, which model provides the best fit?”.
The third part of this section addresses the third research question, “how does senior leadership adapt as the project
moves through its lifecycle?”.
Table 3: A summary of the phases identified for LSRIs and the characteristics of the phase-specific senior leader
Phase Characteristics of phase Characteristics of phase-specific senior leader
Initiation
Many technical ambiguities
Internal debate over which
big machine should form basis
of laboratory strategy
Authoritarian. Technically focussed
Very charismatic. Transformational or
authoritarian leaders preferred by institutions
Approval
Internal debate settled around




Seeking to build consensus
amongst stakeholders
Construction
Construction and civil engineering
Machine assembled. Project leader takes
lead and has freedom to be authoritarian as
necessary
Oversight of the project leader.
Rarely intervenes except in the event of a




a) Full exploitation of the
completed LSRI
b) Horizon scanning to
determine the characteristics
of the next generation of LSRI
Support role to help the laboratory
and collaborations generate data.
Moving resources to help individuals
investigate promising technologies
for the next big machine.
14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3695013
A PREPRINT - SEPTEMBER 3, 2020
A re-examination of the literature considering these findings suggests that the concept of selecting research organisation
senior leaders with the specific intention that they will meet the phase-specific needs of the project is difficult to explain
using the style paradigm of leadership. The Analysis of this information using the style paradigm would indicate that
the senior leader could simply change their leadership style as the project progresses (Bass, 1990). This would have the
benefit of continuity of leadership the laboratory builds the machine. However, substitution of the senior leader for an
alternative one does not fit the style paradigm. Contingency theory does offer a potential explanation for this trend
(Fiedler, 1964). This theory proposes that it is possible to classify a leader and situation using the tools outlined above
in the literature review section.
5.1 Research Questions 1 and 2: “do these LSRIs fit established the lifecycle models?” and “if so which
model provides the best fit?”
The first finding is presented in Table 2, which maps the LSRI project phases identified against the four models from
Table 1. While LSRI project phases do not map perfectly onto any of the lifecycle models, they map onto the traditional
project lifecycle model rather better than either the Wheelwright and Clark (1992) or Gluck and Foster (1975) models.
However, the exploitation phase that begins after the commissioning of the LSRI does not map neatly onto any of the
models because it occurs after project completion. A second finding that is somewhat in conflict with previous literature
is the observation that senior leaders of research organisations tend to get involved in detailed technical decisions at the
early stages of LSRIs, and this level of involvement generally declines as the project proceeds. This contrasts with
the literature which reports that managers, particularly of development projects, do not get involved in early technical
discussions but exercise substantial influence towards the end of the project (Gluck and Foster, 1975; Wheelwright
and Clark, 1992). This is despite the issue that such involvement at end-stages would be at a time when their ability to
influence the final project is limited (Gluck and Foster, 1975; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).
On balance, this contrast results from the deep technical competence that characterises of LSRI leadership. During the
initiation phase, there are many ambiguities and an LSRI project lacks an appointed project leader/manager. Therefore,
authoritarian senior leaders perceive and act on the need to be part of these detailed technical discussions, even if their
proposals require amendment at a later point. This was notably the case for both Robert Wilson at the Tevatron and
Carlo Rubbia at the LHC.
In relation to the lifecycle models used by policymakers, specifically those models used by NSF and ESFRI , there
is significant similarity. Notably the NSF and ESFRI phases of ‘Construction’ and ‘Implementation’ overlap almost
exactly with the LSRI ‘Construction’ phase. However, the most significant difference between models used by funding
agencies and the lifecycle that scientists have devised seems to be the broad range of activities conducted during the
final phases. While policymakers focus on divesting from the project, researchers refocus their attention toward the next
big machine, which means that particle physicists seem to be in a constant state of construction. This is likely more a
reflection of particle physics laboratories which tend to incorporate older machines into the support infrastructure of the
new generation which may not be possible with other types of LSRI. This horizon scanning process also seems to look
much further into the future than current policy of 30 and ten years respectively (Baker, 2016; Burrows, 2017; ESFRI,
2018; Hofstadter et al., 2019). This potentially represents an opportunity for policymakers to capture these ‘bottom-up’
community practices by commissioning a ‘generational survey’ upon completing an LSRI.
The answers to the first and second research questions are that LSRIs do fit these established lifecycle models and that
the LSRI lifecycle fits the traditional project lifecycle model rather better than either the Wheelwright and Clark (1992)
or Gluck and Foster (1975) models. However, of the models used in policy, the large facility lifecycle model used by
NSF captures the LSRI lifecycle rather better in its ‘Divestment’ phase compared to ESFRI as it implies the feasibility
of incorporating one project into the supporting infrastructure of its successor. Table 2 comprises a mapping of the
several lifecycle models from literature and practice mapping onto the corresponding LSRI project phases.
These findings partially conflict with previous literature, in that it is revealed that senior leaders tend to get involved
in detailed technical decisions at the early stages of LSRIs and this level of involvement generally declines as the
project proceeds. This is in with the literature Prior literature states that managers do not get involved in early technical
discussions but rather exercise substantial influence at project end-stages (Gluck and Foster, 1975; Wheelwright and
Clark, 1992). This conflict between the literature and the findings is likely a product of the deep level of technical
competence that is characteristic of leadership in LSRIs.
The appointment of the LSRI project leader, which usually occurs during the approval phase, is a pivotal moment that
marks the senior leader’s transition of the senior leader to an oversight role, focussing on the interfaces between systems
in the array rather than individual systems. A senior leader will normally only get involved with the LSRI project if a
major crisis arises that threatens stakeholder confidence. Therefore, the answer to Research Question 3 is that senior
leadership begins as quite authoritarian with the senior leader unusually getting involved in technical minutiae. As the
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Table 4: A summary of the development project phases proposed by Wheelwright (1992) and Gluck and Foster (1975)
respectively mapped onto the traditional project lifecycle and lifecycle models used by NSF, ESFRI, and US DOE























































project moves through its lifecycle, a new leader is substituted, resulting in a transition to an increasingly democratic
style of leadership. This finding contrasts with prior literature which indicates the reverse trend is more prevalent (Gluck
and Foster, 1975; Frame, 1987; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).
6 Conclusions, implications, and opportunities for future work
Each of these LSRI projects appeared to dominate the parent research organisation to such an extent that selection
of senior leadership was heavily influenced by the needs of the project. When given the freedom to structure their
projects as they see fit, scientists in particle physics tend to organise LSRIs according to a four-phase lifecycle with
each phase corresponding to the five-year tenure of a senior leader. These phases have been described as: Initiation,
Approval, Construction, and Exploitation. These phases map onto the traditional project and the NSF large facility
lifecycles better than the other models described in this chapter. As the LSRI project moves through its lifecycle, the
characteristics of leaders change from authoritarian to increasingly democratic style. This contrasts with prior literature
that describes leadership style transition in reverse – from democratic to authoritarian. This likely results from the high
technology nature of LSRIs, coupled with the unusual factor that the technical competence to design all the systems is
available ‘in-house’.
This article makes contributions to leadership theory and to LSRI domain by demonstrating that it is possible to
apply contingency theory to empirical leadership evidence. In terms of LSRIs, this article takes the Qiao et al. (2016)
definition of LSRIs and draws on the relevant project management literature to provide more robust inclusion criteria
for future work. More precisely, LSRIs can be considered to be a sub-category of megaprojects that incorporate a high
or very high level of technological uncertainty (Shenhar and Dvir, 1996; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). These LSRIs exhibit
lifecycles that map onto traditional project lifecycles rather well although the level of management attention given to
them conflicts with the existing literature.
Research organisations embarking on LSRI construction projects may wish to emulate this strategy. However, it
requires governance arrangements, including the implementation of specific 5-year term limits for senior leaders. Such
a selection process could also include a formalised assessment of the project needs over the next five years using a
contingency theory framework (Fiedler, 1964), a well-embedded concept in particle physics, and as currently applied to
the ‘European Strategy for High Energy Physics’ where it acts as a formalised assessment for the European landscape.
In a more generalised sense, the findings are of value to other types of megaprojects and large organisations in the
private sector. The notion of applying contingency theory to senior leadership selection does not seem to be particularly
innovative. However, it appears to be notably absent in both literature and practice that is limited to noting the
importance of leadership alignment with broader factors such as culture (Taylor and Taylor, 2013); this article begins to
16
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address the next logical steps of this topic, namely how leadership can be brought into alignment with overall strategy.
This could be readily applied in the case of senior organisational leadership but may more challenging in the case of
megaprojects as due to the temporary nature of delivery partner organisations (Davies et al., 2019). It would also require
a significant change in attitude towards senior leadership departures; currently the substitution of a leader is often
presented in the literature as a failure (Graen and Ginsburgh, 1977; van Marrewijk et al., 2008). For such a strategy to
be acceptable in the future, the notion of resignation will need re-framing from admitting failure towards the creation of
a better fit between the leader and a changed situation.
Funders and policymakers may also wish to capture the ‘bottom up’ community assessments that occur once an LSRI
has been completed. Current policy usually assesses community needs within a two-, five-, or ten-year timeframe
(Baker, 2016; ESFRI, 2018; Hofstadter et al., 2019), whereas the community uses a timeframe as long as 30 years. It
may therefore be desirable to introduce a new ‘generational survey’ upon completing an LSRI project to incorporate the
community’s very long-term needs into research strategy.
One potential issue from this research regards its generalisability. Although there was a conscious decision to investigate
two different but related projects, one might reasonably argue that these two projects alone are still an unreliable
foundation for new theory. However, the real impact of LSRIs lies in their size rather than in their frequency - their
substantial cost means that, despite their small numbers, they can have a disproportionate impact on government
budgets.
Several opportunities present themselves for further research. First is to both deepen and diversify this research
elsewhere within the research infrastructure domain. In addition to expanding the study to include more cases within
particle physics, there is also the possibility of investigating different types of research infrastructure which may employ
different leadership selection techniques (ESFRI, 2018). It may also be valuable to repeat the study in other areas such
as infrastructure construction and the energy extraction industries to determine whether this phasing phenomenon is
unique to LSRI construction projects or can be further generalised.
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